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Community ownership of trading enterprises has not been so 
favoured as a concept during the latter part of the 20th century as 
successive New Zealand Governments pursued market forces 
policies. The face of the New Zealand public ownership business 
scene radically changed from the mid 1980's as 
telecommunications, railways, the ports, Coal Corp, energy ... 
were all restructured in pursuit of the market model. Why was 
the public or community ownership model apparently not 
supported? 
The empirical evidence did not unequivocally uphold privatisation 
and the market model as being inherently more efficient as a 
structure. Notably also, community ownership was much enjoyed 
as a concept. 
This research, therefore, looks at the concept of community 
ownership and seeks to define its uniqueness and identify its 
performance in operating trading enterprises. The electricity 
companies in New Zealand were the area selected. 
The results moderately support the view that social/community 
goals are of more importance to community owned trading 
enterprises than their private ownership equivalents. Notably 
community ownership outperformed private enterprise as 
measured by ROE and ROA. 
Thus the contention that community ownership as a concept had 
much to offer, and was not inherently less efficient, was not 
disproved by this research. Further research in other fields is 
worthy of pursuit. 
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This research began with a belief: That community ownership as a 
concept had much to offer, and that community ownership of trading 
enterprises was not inherently less efficient. And yet the evidence of 
events through the latter part of the 20th century pointed to the opposite. 
Megginson et al in his 1994 research on the financial and operating 
performance of newly privatised firms, identified that 
" more than 80 countries have launched ambitious efforts to 
privatise their SOE's. Since 1980 more than 2000 SOE's have 
been privatised in developing countries, 6, 800 worldwide." (p. 
404). 
The New Zealand experience has not been dissimilar. Since the mid 
1980's New Zealand had extensively gone down the privatisation path. 
The face of the New Zealand public ownership business scene has 
radically changed during these years ; telecommunications, railways, 
banking, energy, the Ports, Auckland airport, Coal Corp ... the list is 
extensive. 
The market model was dominant in the pursuit of economic efficiency. 
And yet the changes that occurred in the New Zealand scene from 1984 
onwards were based largely on faith. The empirical evidence to support 
such beliefs as a number of writers identified (Peters and Marshall , 
1988; Kelsey , 1995; Hawke, 1988) did not unequivocally uphold 
privatisation and the market model as being inherently more efficient as 
a structure. 
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It was a further belief that those involved in community ownership of 
trading enterprises had inadequately defined and identified to their 
communities the points of differences between themselves and private 
ownership: What was unique? As private enterprise moved (or was 
forced) to a wider awareness of its impact on society, had the points of 
difference blurred to such an extent that there was confusion as to 
whether there were unique features? The concept of community 
ownership has often been associated with pious ideals and woolly 
thoughts. Was this apparent lack of definition part of the territory? If the 
belief was founded in fact , what was necessary to emphasise the need 
for crisp focus of direction? 
Community ownership of trading enterprises has a long history in 
New Zealand. Banking had been provided by regional Trustee Savings 
Banks for 150 years, and yet through extensive changes in the 1990's 
only one, and that successfully , now survives, the Taranaki Savings 
Bank. Electricity had been generated and supplied by local authorities 
since the early 1900's. Licensing Trusts were established in the mid 
1940's. 
The community model was now clearly not in favour. The changes 
through this period clearly identified that the market model was 
dominant. Why was this so? 
Community ownership as a concept was still well enjoyed. Consider, for 
example, the support for community ownership of the energy companies 
when in 1992 the Government was considering privatisation of the local 
authority based systems. As one official who was involved at that time 
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stated , when the community ownership concept was advanced, there 
was overwhelming support. It was a concept for that time and 
circumstance. As the Government moved down a market model path in 
the delivery of health services, communities rebelled and to save the 
hospital located in their town or area, a number developed a community 
trust system of ownership. 
Thus the beliefs that started this research was contrary to by far the 
great majority of the dynamic change that had occurred in recent years 
so doubt existed. Are community owned trading enterprises less 
efficient? If so, by how much? Is the market model a more efficient 
provider of resources? If so, significantly, or moderately? Are there 
inherent faults in the concept of community ownership, for example, 
does the slow infiltration of politics (Spicer et al, 1996) lead to 
inefficiency and bureaucracy? Is there a uniqueness about community 
ownership and if so, are they clearly understood and expressed? 
Many writers identified how important it was to balance the market model 
with its inherent emphasis on the individual , with the wider concept of 
community, with its emphasis on the 'we', the wider public good. 
Drucker in recent writings (1998) maintained that 'human beings need 
communities', and that 'the private sector - that is, business - cannot fill 
that need ... '. 
Some researchers (for example, Boardman and Vining, 1989) suggest 
that where economic goals are mixed with social/community goals, 
inefficiency results and all objectives are less successfully achieved. 
The separation out of the business unit from community ownership has 
been exampled in the establishment of the energy companies in 1992. 
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But is that necessary? Or does it just duplicate costs and create 
conflicts between different sets of 'actors' with different agendas? Are 
'social and economic goals opposing', or are not 'economic mechanisms 
at the same time social processes'? (New Zealand Public Service 
Association, 1989.) 
In pursuing the beliefs that was the basis of this research , it was evident 
that the key empirical research articles over the past 20 years provided a 
mixed answer. In some cases when comparing equivalent streams of 
private ownership companies with public ownership, the evidence 
supported that public ownership had performed better. On balance 
perhaps the evidence was more to the contrary, particularly in recent 
research . Kay and Thompson 's key conclusion that it is the interaction 
of competition with ownersh ip that promotes efficiency is particularly 
compelling (p. 24, 1986). The time spans for much of the research are 
short and it is reasonable to conclude that the next few years are more 
likely to deliver a more compelling result. 
But there is very limited research that compares the performance of 
community owned organisations to that of private enterprise. A key 
question is whether community ownership delivers a closer sense of 
belonging than that of a more remote public or Government owned 
organisation . This sense of belonging is more likely to be closer to the 
sense of ownership that is inherent in private enterprise. 
In pursuing research that compares the efficiency of community owned 
trading enterprises with their private enterprise counterparts , the impact 
of the nature of community ownership, the wider sense of the well being 
of the community rather than pursuit of individual objectives, was 
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important. Thus a key aspect of the research was to identify if the 
concept of community ownership was understood widely so that in 
debating what is in the best interest of the community in the specific field 
the community organisation may operate, that the widest possible 
choices are made, and all the options are understood and not excluded. 
Thus if a particular industry averages, say a return on equity of 15%, and 
a community organisation wishes to pursue a wider agenda of creating 
employment say, or pursuing economic development policies that will 
encourage firms to set up in their area of operation , and are prepared to 
accept a return on equity of say 10%, are there robust accounting and 
reporting mechanisms that quantify the impact and success or otherwise 
of those employment and economic development goals? 
For if there is not a clear definition of the community goal to be pursued, 
and rigorous accounting and reporting criteria adopted therefore, any 
goal is going to be more difficult to be achieved, and not degenerate into 
warm wishes largely incapable of being judged (Negandhi and 
Ganguly, 1986). Alternatively, and perhaps additionally, in the absence 
of clearly focused social/community goals, do not economic goals take 
precedence (Kulkarni , 1979). 
The concept of community ownership is widely enjoyed (for example, 
Peters and Marshall, 1988). Drucker (1998) maintains that community 
involvement can deliver the ideal effective citizenship where people can 
make a difference. Fukuyama's belief (1995) that there is no necessary 
trade-off for community and efficiency, and 'those that pay attention to 
community may indeed become the most efficient of all' are powerful 
statements that are worthy of research. 
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Thus in pursuing these lines of research , the stream that was selected of 
the electricity companies was tested to see what answers could be 
provided. It is important to recognise the limitations of these 
conclusions. The energy field selected in New Zealand is but one 
stream of data. The energy companies themselves were required by the 
1992 legislation to be successful businesses. This requirement may 
have driven economic performance to the extent that social/community 
goals were not considered in an in depth understanding of the nature of 
community ownership. The data that was available was largely based 
upon the energy companies' performance and to a lesser extent, on the 
deliberations, selection of objectives, priorities, and performance and 
accountability mechanisms of the community trusts themselves. The 
community trusts are the end owner and hold in effect the assets of the 
energy company in trust for the community . Logically the community 
trusts' del iberations should be reflected in their companies' objectives. 
These limitations may have had some influence on the resultant 
selection of social/community objectives. 
Some eight social/community objectives were noted as constant themes 
through the reports and public information generated by the energy 
companies. The key social/community goal that was pursued by the 
community trusts , significantly in advance of that of their private 
enterprise counterparts, was to keep tariffs as low as possible. In 1996 
the community companies' tariffs were 5.69°/o less than that of their 
counterparts, in 1997 8. 70%, and in 1998 6.64%. These lesser tariffs 
had a significant impact on profits foregone for the community 
companies and thus provided a 'hidden' dividend back to the community. 
In ROE terms, the impact in 1996 was 3.61°/o, in 1997 5.00%, and in 
1998 3.54% 
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Another key objective of the community trusts was to deliver a rebate 
back to their community , generally through a reduction in their power 
accounts or tariff holidays. The nature of these community dividends is 
not dissimilar to the dividend a private enterprise company would provide 
to its shareholders. In comparing those two streams of dividends the 
public companies averaged a distribution percentage of tax paid profits 
to their shareholders of 78 .5% over the 3 years 1996 to 1998. The 
community companies distributed 64.5% of tax paid profits. However, 
significantly, a number of the community companies pursued a low profit 
emphasis and when these are excluded the community companies' 
percentage of distribution increases to 83.2%. Thus a fair conclusion is 
that the community companies, while pursuing lower tariff regimes than 
their public company counterparts, also did not disadvantage their 
shareholders, the community , by lesser distributions of dividends. 
Further, the lower tariff regime provides a "hidden" dividend of 
significance. 
The other five social/community objectives noted were not robustly 
pursued. The pursuit of economic growth in their regions, the support of 
community activities, good neighbour/environmental sensitivity 
programmes, and energy generation investment goals, identify that the 
community companies were either not more active in these areas than 
the public companies or the goals were of peripheral interest. Security 
of supply through a high level of capital expenditure that would improve 
the region 's well-being and its ability to compete and attract investment, 
were not notably different between the two streams of data, although the 
community companies did expend more on capital expenditure. The 
community companies invested in the years between 1996 and 1998 
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11.1 % of their fixed assets, compared to the public companies of 9. 7%. 
However, a number of qualifications need to be made, and in particular 
the quality of the systems prior to the establishment of the energy 
companies in the early 1990's, the impact of density in rural and remote 
lines, and the impact of climatic conditions. 
Thus with the sole exception of the low tariff regime objective, 
community energy companies have not actively pursued 
social/community objectives. Because there was a legislative 
requirement that they operate as successful businesses, interpretations 
may have been made by the community trusts that this limited the range 
of choice that was available to them. It may be also that the market 
philosophy that was, and is dominant, in the New Zealand environment 
again limited debate on the choices that may have been available. Thus 
further research into other industry sectors where community ownership 
is actively involved , would be desirable to strengthen the conclusions 
above. But the belief that community structured organisations often do 
not clearly identify their uniqueness is not disproved. 
In analysing the economic performance of the community companies as 
compared to their public company counterparts, a number of conclusions 
can be made. Firstly the average return on equity for the three years 
1996 to 1998 for the pubic companies was 9.29°/o . The community 
companies averaged 8.07%. The impact of the low tariff regime, is 
significant when adjustments are made to place an exactly similar tariff 
regime on the community companies that the public companies pursued. 
Return on equity would be improved in 1996 by 3.61 %, in 1997 5.00%, 
and in 1998 3.54%. When the average of these (4.05%) is added to the 
recorded results in annual accounts and reports as noted above of 
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8.07%, the community companies achieved returns on equity of 12.12% 
significantly above those of their public company equivalents. The 
Return on Assets ratios (ROA) support a similar pattern. Thus it can be 
concluded that community companies are not less efficient. 
CONCLUSION 
This study sought to advance knowledge on the performance of 
community owned trading enterprises. Two hypotheses were proposed. 
The fi rst of these was that social/community objectives are of significant 
importance. The research on the energy companies supports this 
contention moderately. The impact on financial performance of the key 
social/community goal pursued was very significant. 
The second hypothesis related to performance as judged by key 
financial indicators. In this area , the commun ity owned energy 
companies achieved higher ROE and ROA than their private ownership 
counterparts. 
Section 2 following reviews the literature pertaining to this study. 
Section 3 develops the two hypotheses, section 4 the research methods, 
section 5 analyses the results of the research and section 6 summarises 
the conclusions. References and Tables complete this document. 
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